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Abstract 
This study attempted to examine the direction of causality between government expenditure and revenue in 
Nigeria. This was with a view to examining the validity of Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis and its implications on 
Nigerian economy. Times series data on variables (government expenditure, government revenue and inflation) 
covering the period (1961-2010) were used after a thorough investigation of the statistical properties of these 
variables. The data were sourced from CBN Statistical Bulletin 2010 edition, CBN Annual Reports (various 
years) and World Development Indicators of the World Bank CD-ROM. The study employed Johansen 
multivariate cointegration technique, Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) and standard Granger 
causality tests. The result showed that variables converge to a long-run equilibrium. Also, the VECM results 
indicate that unidirectional causality running from expenditure to revenue was found supporting Peacock-
Wiseman spend-revenue hypothesis. Standard Granger causality test was also carried out on the first difference 
of the two fiscal variables; the result showed that there existed a short-run unidirectional causality running from 
expenditure to revenue validating Peacock-Wiseman spend-revenue hypothesis. Hence, this hypothesis holds in 
Nigeria both in the short-run as well as in the long-run. 
This implies that government spending induced government revenue growth in Nigeria. Also, the result of the 
impulse response revealed that the evolution of government expenditure and revenue followed a different trend.  
The study concluded that government spending decision occurred prior the decision to raise revenue during the 
period under investigation. 
Keywords: causality, multivariate, converge, uni-directional, short-run, long-run. 
 
1. Introduction 
The debate on the direction of causality between government revenue and expenditure has received great 
attention among scholars and public finance analysts in the recent time. This growing debate on the causal 
direction between revenue and expenditure has produced two popular hypotheses in the public finance literature. 
The first of this hypothesis is revenue-spend hypothesis while the second is called spend-revenue hypothesis. 
The first hypothesis states that causality runs from government revenue to expenditure while the second 
hypothesis states that causality is in the opposite direction, that is, from government expenditure to revenue. The 
revenue-spend hypothesis postulates a causal relation running from revenue to spending which implies that 
spending adjust in response to changes in revenues. This hypothesis was initially formulated by Friedman (1978) 
and Buchanan and Wagner (1978), but these authors differed in their perspectives. While Friedman (1978) 
argues that the causal relationship works in a positive direction, Buchanan and Wagner (1978) postulate that the 
causal relationship is negative. According to Friedman raising revenue would lead to more government spending 
and hence to fiscal imbalances. Cutting revenue is, therefore, the appropriate remedy to budget deficits. 
On the contrary, Buchanan and Wagner (1978) propose an increase in taxes as remedy for deficit budgets. Their 
point of view is that with a cut in revenue earnings of government, the public will perceive that the cost of 
government programmes has fallen and hence raise demand for more programmes from the government which if 
undertaken will result in an increase in government spending. Higher budget deficits will then be realized since 
revenue earnings will decline and government spending will increase. 
The spend-revenue hypothesis otherwise known as Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis is valid when spending hikes 
created by some special events such as natural, economic or political crises compel government to increase 
revenue by raising taxes or by borrowing or through seigniorage. As higher spending now tends to lead to higher 
tax later, this hypothesis suggests that spending cuts are the desired solution to reducing budget deficits. This 
hypothesis is also consistent with Barro’s (1979) view that today’s deficit-financed spending means increased 
tax liabilities in the future in the context of the Ricardian equivalence proposition. An understanding of this 
causal link might contribute to the formulation of specific policies with regard to deficits management for 
countries running large fiscal imbalances. 
Budget deficits reduction could be achieved through either spending cuts or raising revenue. 
However, it is very uncertain which of these options will lower deficits for long time. To know which is likely to 
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be the more efficient strategy to achieve permanent reductions in budget deficits, the analysis of the direction of 
causality between public revenues and expenditures can offer a relevant guideline. 
Empirical evidence against Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis has been found by Manage and Marlow (1986), 
Marlow and Manage (1987) and Bohn (1991) for the USA; Owoye (1995); Ewing and Payne (1998); Park 
(1998); Chang et al. (2002); Chang and Ho(2002a); Fuess et al. (2003); Baghestani and AbuAl-Foul (2004); 
Sobhee (2004) and Yaya Keho (2009) for Cote D’ivoire. 
Studies providing evidence in support of Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis include Anderson et al. (1986); Von 
Furstenberg et al. (1986) and Ram (1988a) for the USA; Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996) and 
Vamvoukas(1997) for Greece; and Dhanasekaran (2001) for India. A critical observation of most of these studies 
revealed that studies concentrating on the validation of Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis are scarce for Nigeria.  
This study therefore becomes necessary in order to shed light on whether Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis holds in 
Nigeria. The finding of this study will have important policy implication; it is an indication that fiscal authority 
takes spending decision first and then decides on how to raise revenue.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section produces the theoretical and empirical literature 
review. Section 3 describes the data and methods used in the analysis. Section 4 reports the empirical findings 
while section 5 draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
Theoretically, causality between government expenditure and revenue are associated with different schools of 
Thought. There is divergence of opinions as regard the direction of causality between the two fiscal variables. 
To Keynes and the Keynesians, government should spend first and then raise revenue in order to balance what 
could be referred to as fiscal equation. This view is based on the theory of compensatory finance, where fiscal 
deficits are created to boost economic growth. Subsequently, through an in-built mechanism, the multiplier effect 
of budget would eliminate any output gap and ensure a higher tax base, from which the extra tax revenue would 
be generated to pay off for the initially created fiscal deficit. 
To the Classical economics, budget must always balance. Government expenditure must not exceed its revenue. 
This school of thought believes in what is known as fiscal neutrality. They are of the view that any mismatch 
between government expenditure and revenue could harm the workings of the economy. It could have 
distortionary effects on the smooth operation of the price system. Hence, fiscal neutrality in this context dictates 
revenue and then spend paradigm. It is clearly understood that this view stands an opposing end to that of the 
Keynesian. What stands in-between  both of these extremes is the fiscal syncronisation hypothesis, a situation in 
which the motivation to raise revenue and to spend is determined simultaneously (see Brown and Jackson, 1991), 
Lindahl (1958) and Musgrave (1966).  
Empirical studies exploring the direction of causality between government expenditure and revenue include 
Peacock and Wiseman (1979), Gounder et al., (2007), Bohn (1991), Mount and Sowell (1997), Garcia and Henin 
(1999), Hoover and Sheffrin (1992), Eita and Mbazima (2008), Sobhee (2004), Okeho (2009).  According to the 
empirical literature, while there is no consensus in the findings of most studies, studies differ in the use of 
control variables, some studies also did not include control variable in their analysis, having noted this, the 
present study introduced inflation as a control variable. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
This paper uses government expenditure (GOVEXP), government revenue (GOVREV) and CPI. These time 
series data were sourced from CBN statistical bulletin 2010 edition, CBN Annual Reports (various years) and 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 published by the World Bank covering the period (1961-2010). The 
study employed Johansen multivariate cointegration techniques, vector error correction mechanism and standard 
Granger causality tests to examine the direction of causality between government expenditure and revenue. To 
avoid spurious regression, the study attempted to test the stationarity of the variables by employing the 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron unit root tests.  If variables are non-stationary, there is a 
possibility that one or more cointegration relationships among the variables exist (Engle & Granger, 1987).  The 
study therefore applied the Johansen and Juselius maximum likelihood test (Johansen and Juselius,1990) to test 
for cointegration between the variables based on a VAR model specified as follows: 
 =   +   	


	
	 +  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (1) 
where  is a vector of variables,  is a vector of constant terms,  are coefficient matrices,  is the number of 
lags, and  is a vector of the disturbance term with a mean of zero and constant variance. By reparameterizing 
Eqn. (1), the corresponding VECM is obtained: 
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where ∆ is the first difference operator,    
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By checking the rank of ,  the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables can be detected. 
Finally, a causality test is conducted based on VECM, following Granger (1988). 
Most studies on causality between government expenditure and revenue have used bivariate models while a few 
recent studies have adopted a multivariate analysis by including a control variable in the VECM specification. 
This study adopted a multivariate approach by including inflation as a control variable in the causality tests.  
The study also adopted a bivariate Granger causality tests to find out if the result will be consistent with that 
obtained from the VECM. This is thus specified as follows: 
 !"#$%    =        &	 !"'#"	  
()
	
+  ϕ+ !"#$%,+  + ε-,  … … … … … … … … … . . (3)
()

 
 !"'#"   =        /	 !"#$%	   
(0

+  ψ+ !"'#",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Where ∆ is first difference operator, ε-,  and ε1,  are white noise error terms. GOVEXP is government 
expenditure, GOVREV is government revenue, &,  ϕ,  /, ψ, are parameters to be estimated,  >, >-, are the 
number of lags in the VAR. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The result of the ADF unit root test shown in Table 1(a) revealed that variables in their level form follow a I(1) 
process. They become stationary after first differencing. The study also employed Phillips-Perron unit root test. 
Phillips-Perron unit root test is adjudged in the literature to be more robust and can increase the power of a test 
especially when Time series data are involved. Hence when ADF and PP tests do not produce the same result, 
the result obtained from the PP test is adopted. However, both tests in this study produced the same result. The 
result of PP unit root test shown in Table 1b revealed that all variables are nonstationary at level. They all 
become stationary after first differencing.  
 
Table 1a: Result of Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test 
  
Variable ADF Test-statistic 
      at level 
MacKinnon 
5% Critical      
value 
ADF Test-statistic 
at First 
Difference 
MacKinnon 
5% Critical 
value 
Order of 
Integration 
GOVEXP -1.2149 -3.5298 -9.8260 -3.5298     I(1) 
GOVREV -0.3490 -3.5298 5.1680 -3.5298     I(1) 
 
LOG(CPI) 
 
-1.5575 
 
-3.5298 
 
-4.4155 
 
-3.5298 
   
  I(1) 
Source: computed by the author 
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Table 1b:  Result of Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
  
Variable PP Test-
statistic 
      At Level 
MacKinnon 
5% Critical      
Value 
PP Test-
statistic 
At  First 
Difference 
MacKinnon 
5% Critical 
Value 
Order of 
Integration 
GOVEXP -1.6219 -3.5266 -9.8236 -3.5298     I(1) 
GOVREV -0.0456 -3.5266 -4.6387 -3.5298     I(1) 
LOG(CPI) -1.5325 -3.5266 -4.3766 -3.5298     I(1) 
Source: computed by the author 
 
After the issue of stationarity of the variables has been settled, next was to determine the number of cointegrating 
relationships, the maximum likelihood method of estimation proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990)  was 
employed. The results are presented in Table 2a and 2b. Both the trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue 
suggest the existence of one cointegrating vector indicating that variables converge to a long-run equilibrium. 
Also, as suggested by Engle and Granger (1987), if cointegration exists between two variables, there must be at 
least causality in one direction, the idea of no causality therefore becomes a myth. 
 
Table 2a: Result of Johansen Cointegration Test (Trace test) 
 
Date: 02/15/13   Time: 11:15   
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2010   
Included observations: 38 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: GOVEXP GOVREV    
Exogenous series: LOG(CPI)    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.661641  47.64756  15.49471  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.156535  6.468982  3.841466  0.0110 
     
      Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table 2b: Result of Johansen Cointegration Test (Maximum Eigenvalue test) 
Date: 02/15/13   Time: 11:15  
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2010  
Included observations: 38 after adjustments 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Series: GOVEXP GOVREV   
Exogenous series: LOG(CPI)   
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.661641  41.17858  14.26460  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.156535  6.468982  3.841466  0.0110 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
After we have confirmed that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between government expenditure and 
government revenue via consumer prices in the economy, the study proceeds by providing the estimates of the 
dynamics that characterized this unique relationship. The result of the VECM is reported in Table 3. It is 
important to note that CPI plays the role of a control variable, and tend to track any additional feedback effect 
which the exogenous variable may have on the dependent variable. The optimal lag length chosen in the two 
equations based on SIC is set at 2. 
It was found that, it is only in the DGOVREV equation that the lagged value of the residual is significant. In 
general, the coefficients in the DGOVEXP equation are insignificant and it appears that neither GOVREV nor 
CPI turn out to explain changes in GOVEXP. Hence, there is unidirectional causality running from expenditure 
to revenue. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Sobhee (2003) and Sobhee (2004) who found 
unidirectional causality in the opposite direction.  
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Table 3: Result of VECM 
    D(GOVEXP)  D(GOVREV) 
CONSTANT 654083.7[2.004] 303613.0[6.599] 
D(GOVEXP(-1)) -0.879[-2.53] -0.248[-5.061]* 
D(GOVEXP(-2)) -0.020[-0.043] -0.352[-5.405]* 
D(GOVREV(-1)) -1.405[-1.642] -0.528[-4.374] 
D(GOVREV(-2)) -1.412[-1.550] -0.248[-1.928] 
D(LOG(CPI(-1))) -745365.9[-0.801] -175059.4[-1.334] 
D(LOG(CPI(-2))) -89808.9[-0.100] -130570.3[-1.028] 
#?@ 0.494[1.684] 0.367[8.894]* 
R-Squared 0.359 0.785 
Adj. R-Squared 0.210 0.734 
Akaike AIC 30.15934 26.24086 
Schwarz SC 30.50410 26.58561 
F-statistic 2.402167 15.61907 
VECM DIAGNOSTIC TEST: LM-Stat 6.941[0.643]  JB-Stat 6.282[0.392]  Cross Terms Heteroscedasticity 
Test-Stat 220.681[0.293] 
Note: [] = t-statistic, * = sig at 1%, ** = sig at 5% 
 
 
The study further applied bivariate standard Granger causality test using the first difference of the two fiscal 
variables, the result as presented in Table 4 showed that unidirectional causality running from expenditure to 
revenue existed between the two variables. This indicates that a short-run one-way causality running from 
expenditure to revenue existed in Nigeria during the period under study.  
 
Table 4: Short run Causality using the bivariate standard Granger causality test 
 
Null Hypothesis Obs F-Stat Prob. Decision    Rule 
D(GOVREV) does not Granger cause D(GOVEXP)  37 0.391 0.679 Do no reject Ho 
D(GOVEXP) does not Granger cause D(GOVREV)  37 5.227 0.011* Reject Ho 
|* indicates rejection of hypothesis of no causality at 5% level of significance 
 
Impulse response analysis 
The study also embarked on the impulse response analysis of the two fiscal variables central to this study. The 
result which confirms our findings is reported in the appendix. It showed how each endogenous variable 
responds to one standard deviation shock in the VECM equation. Over a horizon of 10 periods, it can be clearly 
seen that the evolution of government expenditure and revenue follows a different trend. At the initial time, 
government expenditure exhibits a positive trend while revenue exhibits a negative trend which later changes to 
positive. Also, how each variable responds to one standard deviation shock each period seems not to follow the 
same pattern. This buttress the fact that expenditure and revenue decisions are not made simultaneously and that 
expenditure decision was taking prior to revenue decision. It looks as if the periodic response is not the same. 
Expenditure changes do not necessarily respond to a lag or lags of changes in government revenue. What is more 
alluring is that expenditure changes rather precede revenue changes. In either direction therefore, it is observed 
that it is expenditure changes that stimulate revenue changes and not in the other way round. Similarly, in either 
case, the shocks do not die out; it persists over at least the 10 periods shown.  
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5. Conclusion 
This study was carried out to find out the direction of causality between government expenditure and revenue, 
this was with a view to determining the validity of Peacock-Wiseman revenue-spend hypothesis and its 
implications on Nigeria economic growth. Time series data covering the periods 1961 to 2010 were used for this 
study. The statistical properties of the data were properly investigated using appropriate econometric techniques. 
The study employed a multivariate analysis by introducing a control variable in the VECM specification. The 
findings showed that unidirectional causality running from expenditure to revenue was found to exist between 
government expenditure and government revenue. The study found short-run and long-run causal evidence 
running from expenditure to revenue supporting Peacock-Wiseman revenue-spend hypothesis. Taking spending 
decision prior decision to raise revenue might be responsible for the growth of fiscal deficits in Nigeria during 
the study period.  This has a serious implication on fiscal discipline especially in an economy characterized with 
high level of corruption and ineptitude like Nigeria. The basic rule of cutting your coat according to your size is 
vehemently violated. The nation lives so extravagantly when the resources available are not actually in support 
of such a living.  
The study concluded that government spending decision occurred prior the decision to raise revenue in Nigeria 
during the period under investigation. 
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Appendix 
Graph of variables (single) 
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Graph of variables (multiple) 
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GRAPHS OF RESIDUALS 
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Result of the impulse response analysis 
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